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Available online 11 June 2018This paper gives an analysis of some conceptual issues in the neuroscientific study of empathy. The focuswill almost
exclusively be on a seminal paper by Decety and Jackson (2004) on the functional architecture of empathy. The au-
thors withstand reductionistic tendencies in the exposition of what their findingsmightmean for the psychology of
social cognition. They are aware of the thorny conceptual issues that arise when attempting to bridge intuitive folk
psychological conceptions of empathy with explanations offered by social psychology, developmental science, and,
most of all, neuroscience. They defend a conception which puts emphasis on the developmental, interactional and
human aspects of empathy. In the second part of the paper we will see that this overt contention is at some points
at odds with the conceptual framework that underlies the presentation of scientific findings. It will appear that the
method of decomposition, i.e., breaking empathy down into (mutually interacting) ‘pieces’, is difficult to reconcile
with the idea that empathy should primarily be defined as an interactional phenomenon. Themethod of decompo-
sition puts empathy back within the brain, whereas recent philosophical work argues that empathy needs a defini-
tionwhich includes both processes in the empathizing subject and in the personwithwhomthe subject empathizes.
In the final part of the paper it is asked whether, how and to what extent it does matter that professionals know
about the social neuroscience of empathy and, especially, its underlying conceptual framework. It is argued that con-
ceptual innovations that currently are emerging in social neuroscience do matter for clinical and legal practices. In
spite of the limitations mentioned earlier, Decety & Jackson's developmental and interactional approach helps to
overcome reductionistic and mentalistic interpretations of human empathy.
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Philosophical questions about neuroscientific research typically arise
at the intersection between neuroscience and clinical practice and be-
tween neuroscience and lay people's understanding of brain processes.
Such questions do often emerge as a result of translating neuroscientific
research findings to other domains than science proper. One of the as-
sumptions behind this paper is that philosophical issues typically arise asa result of these translations; and that they depend on subtle shifts in
meaningof concepts that are used at both sides of the boundaries between
neuroscience, clinical practice and the life-world of lay people. One other
assumption of the current investigation is, that in these zones of transition
between different domains and their relevant vocabularies it is not always
clear whether one is dealing with empirical or conceptual issues.
This paper focuses on one phenomenon, i.e., empathy, more particu-
larly, on one authoritative, neuroscientific account of it, i.e., a review by
Decety and Jackson (2004) (see Singer & Lamm, 2009, for a shorter re-
view; recent updates in Decety, 2015; Decety & Yoder, 2015, 2017;
Yoder & Decety, 2018). Decety and colleagues have devoted much of
their scientific work to the analysis of human empathy and its role in
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article is seminal because of its explicit focus on conceptual issues.
Their stance on these issues has not changed in later years. It is also rel-
evant for the field of mental health and law, because of the role of (lack
of) empathy in forensic psychiatric settings, especially the assessment
and treatment of offenders with autism or antisocial personality
disorder.
In this paper, I will especially address the question whether and, if
so, how and to what extent it does matter that professionals know
about the neuroscience of empathy. Would it make a difference to
their attitudes, their decisions, how they behave and what they gener-
ally do, if they would have in-depth knowledge about the neuroscien-
tific underpinnings of empathy? A related issue is what such ‘in-depth
knowledge’ would be. Is it scientific knowledge, or ‘translated’, clinical
knowledge, or even further translated, popular, everyday lay-
knowledge? These questions may also arise in the reverse direction.
What exactly is meant with the concept of empathy in a neuroscientific
context? Ifwe assume, asmany scientists do, that empathy is something
like ‘feeling and knowingwhat another person is feeling, knowing, and/
or intending’, then, what exactly are neuroscientists studying? The en-
tire phenomenon? Or, aspects or components of the phenomenon?
And, if we assume that our understanding of empathy is derived
from our everyday understanding of it; and that it has acquired an
only slightly more specific meaning in the context of (developmen-
tal) psychology, then, again, what does this everyday folk psycholog-
ical and developmental concept of empathy mean in the context of
neuroscientific research? On what grounds are we going to decide
about which scientific findings are essential for the understanding
of empathy? Are these grounds empirical or conceptual, or both?
And how do we know whether the neuroscientifically explained
phenomena (the explanandum) are relatively meaningless correlates
or manifestations of a deeper explanatory reality, i.e., a mechanism
or causally relevant process (the explanans)?
Decety & Jackson's, 2004 paper is particularly interesting because of
its strong conceptual focus and its resistance against reductionistic ten-
dencies. The authors appear to be aware of thorny conceptual issues
that arise when attempting to bridge the intuitive folk psychological
conception of empathy with explanations offered by social psychology,
developmental science, and, most of all, neuroscience. They defend a
conception which puts much emphasis on the developmental, interac-
tional and human aspects of empathy. However, we will see that this
overt contention is somewhat at odds with the conceptual framework
that underlies the presentation of scientific findings. It will appear that
themethod of decomposition, i.e., breaking empathy down into (mutu-
ally interacting) ‘pieces’, is difficult to reconcilewith the idea that empa-
thy should primarily be defined as an interactional phenomenon. The
method of decomposition puts empathy backwithin the brain, whereas
recent philosophical work argues that empathy needs a definition
which includes both processes in the empathizing subject and in the
person with whom the subject empathizes. We will analyse some of
conceptual issues that arise as a result of this tension between ‘within-
the-subject’ (individualistic) and ‘between subjects’ (interactional) ap-
proaches. Attentionwill be paid to differences between underlying con-
ceptual frameworks in the relevant domains of scientific and clinical
understanding. We will analyse these differences from a translational
point of view, i.e., the point of view that is implied in the popular notion
of translational neuroscience.
In the final section, we will see that many of the questions that
emerge at the zones of transition between folk psychological, clinical,
and scientific approaches to mental phenomena are both empirical
and conceptual; and that it is often impossible to disentangle the con-
ceptual from the empirical. It will be argued that instead of trying to
keep distance to the conceptual vagueness of these transition
zones, neuroscientists should tolerate the intrinsic uncertainties at
the boundaries of their subdisciplines and exploit their creative po-
tential when facing this intrinsic unclarity and ambiguity at theboundaries of their fields. It is here that new and innovative insights
are born.
2. Empathy – preliminary conceptual considerations
Empathy is a psychological capacity which is crucial for human so-
cial functioning. Until today, the scientific study of this capacity is influ-
enced by age-old philosophical ideas and frameworks of understanding.
One such idea is the notion of empathy as a form of ‘mind-reading’
which returns in the widely used concept of ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM).
ToM accounts of empathy are vulnerable for the Cartesian problem of
knowing ‘other minds’ (De Bruin, 2010). Descartes thought that
human beings only know their own minds (the famous ‘ego cogito’ as
starting point of all knowing) and that there is no immediate way to
know what is going on in the mind of others. Knowledge of other
minds becomes a matter of observation and induction. It was David
Hume who provided the answer to the Cartesian problem, by
reconstruing empathy as process that is based on the observation of ‘re-
semblance’ and on inferential reasoning based on drawing analogies be-
tween body –mind associations in others and inmyself. The idea is that
when we feel empathy for another's mental state, for instance an emo-
tion like anger, thatwe begin by observing changes in the bodily state of
the other.We see for instance an increase inmuscle tension and a frown
on the other's face and recognize the resemblance between this body
state and facial expression and similar body states and facial expressions
in ourselves.We subsequently associate our own (imagined, simulated)
bodily state and facial expression with the mental states we tend to
have when our bodies are in the same condition. We finally infer from
this association between bodily and mental states in ourselves that
the other must be in a similar mental state.
Recent philosophical accounts on social cognition build forth on this
Humean account, by emphasizing either the element of ‘resemblance’
(simulation theory) or the role of ‘inference’ (theory theory). Simulation
theories (ST) focus on resemblance by hypothesizing that we know the
mental state of others, i.e., their intentions, feelings, and thoughts, on
the basis of an ‘internal simulation’ of what is going on in them. Neuro-
scientific support for this idea comes, among others, from the so-called
mirror-neuron theory (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Mirror neurons are a
group of visuomotor neurons, that discharge bothwhen the subject per-
forms a particular action and when it observes another individual
performing a similar action (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; see also
Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996, Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi, &
Gallese, 1996). Perception and action are coupled: observing the emo-
tions and intentions of another person activates parts of our brains
that underlie similar emotions and intentions in ourselves. The other
strand of theorizing, known as theory theory (TT), puts emphasis on
the inferential nature of empathy. Knowing the mind of the other is
based on inferences about the other's behaviour.
Both approaches have been criticized of beingmentalistic. ‘Mentalis-
tic’ are those conceptions of the mind that consider the mind to be
transparent only for itself. Mentalism leads to solipsism, i.e., the idea
that we can only know our own (conscious) mind. Knowing what
others feel and think occurs indirect and after the fact. Empathy is basi-
cally a form of ‘retrodicting’, a backward explanation of phenomena that
were not transparent by themselves at the moment they occurred. This
idea runs counter to lay-conceptions of knowing others, which tend to
view empathy as a form knowing ‘by direct acquaintance’. Or, with
the words of Shaun Gallagher (2005): the traditional Humean view on
empathy suggests that “the subject who understands the other person
is not interacting with the other person so much as interacting with
an internally simulatedmodel of himself pretending to be the other per-
son”. This means that real “second-person interaction is reduced to a
first-person internal activity”.
Moving now to the conceptual challenges that are awaiting us, we
have just mentioned one of the biggest, i.e., the challenge of doing jus-
tice to the interactional (‘second-person’) nature of empathy. If
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but essentially a process or interaction) between two persons, then
this should in some way be reflected in theories on empathy. There
are other challenges. One is that empathy is more than sympathy. It is
not just some form of (affective, mental) resonance. One reason is that
it is very well possible to empathize with what is going on in someone
else, without identifying oneself with the feelings and intentions of
the other. This is, for instance, crucial in the professional formation of
psychotherapists. They need to be able to ‘be with the patient’ while
at the same time being aware of their own feelings and inclinations,
which may differ from those of the patient. This brings us to two other
features of empathy, which are implied in this capacity: the ability to
distinguish the feelings, attitudes and inclinations of the other from
those of oneself (self-other distinction) and self-regulation. Spontane-
ous inclinations, i.e., for instance, a reaction of disgust for a patient
who smells and looks dirty, should be inhibited to be able to empathize
with this person. This self-regulation includes the ability to adopt the
perspective of another person, while maintaining one's own
perspective.
3. Decety and Jackson's analysis of the functional architecture of hu-
man empathy
In their landmark paper on empathy Decety and Jackson (2004) are
clear from the start that they see the conceptual challenges mentioned
in the previous section. They state that empathy is not just an inference,
or just sympathy (feeling the same as some else). They quote Ickes
(2003)who defines empathy as the ability to feel and to knowwhat an-
other person is feeling, while having the intention to respond compas-
sionately to the other's feelings. So, empathy is not only a state of
being receptive to the signals of others, it is also an active attempt to
tune in into the mind, or better, the world of the other. Empathy is a
complex and typically human phenomenon, they argue. It differs from
animal empathy in that it does not only involve sympathy,
i.e., recognizing and sharing the feelings and intentions of others, but
also the capacities mentioned in the last section: self-other distinction,
the ability to flexibly navigate between different perspectives (mental
flexibility) and self-regulation. Evolutionary accounts have something to
offer to the analysis of social cognition, but they fall short in the explana-
tion of this typically human aspect of empathy, i.e., the capacity to adopt
different stances or perspectives. It is on the basis of this capacity that
humans are able to adopt the perspective of another personwithout iden-
tifying their feelingswith those of the other. This kind of higher order reg-
ulation is in turn determinedby social understanding andmoral concerns,
as Decety argues in a recent publication (Decety & Yoder, 2015).
Social neuroscience should be considered as a science that harbors
and integrates several disciplines. Among those disciplines are develop-
mental science, cognitive and social psychology, and neuroscience. The
integration is guided by a putative model which describes the constitu-
tive components of empathy and their interaction. This latter expres-
sion (‘constitutive components’) indicates how Decety and Jackson
attempt to solve themethodological problemof how to scientifically in-
vestigate empathy as a complex and interactional phenomenon. This
complexity is dealt with by ‘breaking the concept down into its consti-
tutive components’ and by ‘examining the respective neural instantia-
tions’ of these components.
Decety and Jackson discern three of these components. All three
contribute to the subjective experience of empathy:
a) an affective response to another person, which often, but not always,
entails sharing that person's emotional state; based on perception-
action coupling that leads to shared representations;
b) a cognitive capacitywhich enables us to distinguish between self and
other; and.
c) regulatory mechanisms that keep track of the origins of self and
other-feelings; that enable one to adopt the perspective of otherpersons (mental flexibility) and to temporarily identify with the
feelings and inclinations of others, without confusion between one-
self and the other.
These three ‘components’ are intertwined and interact with one
another.
The first component (sharing the other's mental state) is made pos-
sible by shared representations between self and others, Decety and Jack-
son argue. The idea is similar to the thesis defended in the mirror
neuron theory, i.e., that there exists a continuity between perception
and action,which implies that the perception of certain intentions or af-
fects in other humans evokes a response in action neurons of the per-
ceiving person that are similar to those of the observed person. Decety
and Jackson suggest that empathy should be seen as the developmental
result of a shared practice, i.e., as a capacity that has evolved, in the
course of time, out of patterns of interaction between people. The neural
correlate of this ‘sharing’ and ‘interacting’ is neural similarity between
recognition and expression of emotion and intentions within the sub-
ject and similarity between neural activity in the empathizing person
and the object of empathy. The key conceptual question with respect
to this neural reconceptualization of empathic responses is, whether
the interactional aspect of these responses, i.e., empathy as a process
of attuning to the other, is sufficiently accounted for with this notion
of neural similarity, both within the empathic subject and between
this subject and the object of empathy. Is similarity between neurons
a sufficient explanation of the temporal and dynamic aspects of the pro-
cess of attuning? Similarity would, indeed, be compatible with the no-
tion of resonance, or, to use a visual analogy, with mirroring.
However, resonance and mirroring are analogies that highlight the re-
ceptive side, the passive occurrence of something similar, whereas
attuning also involves activity from the side of the empathizing subject.
The second component of empathy is awareness of the distinction
between self and others. The idea is twofold. Action representations of
oneself and of the one with whom one empathizes, are (again) based
on the same intentional schema's, which are mediated by the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC). This identity, or overlap, ‘explains’ recogni-
tion of intention. But the overlap between self- and other-related repre-
sentations is only partial. The existence of non-overlapping parts
explains why we can distinguish our own agency from the agency of
others. The notion of agency is supposed to entail the ability to act in ac-
cordance with one's intentions. Recognition of intentions/agency of
others overlaps in themPFC but not in other areas of the brain. Recogni-
tion of others is also mediated by activity in the right inferior partietal
cortex(riPC), whereas recognition of agency of oneself is (also) associ-
ated with activation of the insula (I) and the prefrontal cortex (PFC).
From a conceptual point of view, a similar question arises as with re-
spect to the notion of shared representations: does similarity, or, in
this case, the combination of similarity and difference, explain interac-
tive attuning as a dynamic process? A related question concerns the no-
tion of recognition itself, which not only entails recognition of similarity,
but also recognition of otherness. Empathy may lead to recognition of
similarity between one's own reactions and the reactions of another
person, but how does it lead to recognition of otherness (‘difference’).
What kind of difference, or otherness, are we talking about? Is it
what remains after subtracting the recognition of similarity/identity
(mPFC + I + PFC) from the experience of empathy as a whole
(mPFC+ riPC+ I + PFC)? That would in fact reduce recognition of dif-
ference/otherness to a discrepancy between neural maps/circuits
representing different mental states. Difference can be conceptualized
in many ways: numerical, spatial, in terms of dynamic patterns, or ge-
netics, or temperament, or social roles, or existential attitudes (et
cetera). The recognition (and appreciation) of difference/otherness
that is implied in empathy as a human capacity is insufficiently caught
with a conceptual framework that derives its notion of difference from
mathematical (dynamical pattern) or spatial (brain maps) or physical
(brain circuits) approaches to the brain.
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self-regulation) the authors suggest that itmight be explained by frontal
inhibition, which counteracts the natural bias toward adopting an ‘ego-
centric perspective’, combined with the ability to put oneself in the
shoes of the other person. This requires an active effort of the empathiz-
ing subject that entails more than just recognition of intentions and
emotions. The key conceptual problem is here, how to conceptualize
this perspective taking. Is the ability to adopt the perspective of another
person a purely internal process, i.e., a form of ‘mentalizing’? Is it, to use
an earlier expression, an internal simulation of the mental state of the
other in oneself? If that would be the case, we would again be back at
the traditional mentalistic conception of empathy and lose the interac-
tional and dynamic quality of empathy. But it is difficult to see how
this consequence could be avoided. The method of decomposition
seems a prerequisite for scientists to say anything at all about empathy.
But one of the by-products of this method for neuroscientists is that it
puts empathy backwithin the brain, thereby reintroducing all the prob-
lems of representationalist and mentalistic approaches to the mind.
4. Discussion and conclusion
Empathy is a complex and layered phenomenon. It is not a simple
resonance of affect between the self and other. It involves an explicit
representation of the subjectivity of the other and the ability to navigate
between different (self- and other) perspectives. Today's social neuro-
science is able to investigate the neural background of these capacities.
There is not only conceptual, but also empirical evidence that there is no
unitary empathy system in the brain. Decety and Jackson discern at least
three dissociable (sub)systemsmediating the experience of empathy. In
recent publications they also discuss the role of another, fourth, ‘sys-
tem’, i.e., higher order social schema's and moral intuitions which regu-
late the balancing of the different perspectives on others and oneself
(Decety & Yoder, 2015, 2017).
We have seen that the strategy of breaking empathy down into com-
ponents easily detracts from the ‘holism’ of the interactional perspec-
tive. The idea of ‘shared practices’ serves as a guiding idea. It is derived
from folk psychological and developmental perspectives on the know-
ing of others. However, the inclusive and dynamic nature of empathic
attunement could only partially be accounted for from a neuroscience
perspective. Decety and Jackson clarify how other brain circuits than
those mediating resonance and mirroring may contribute to the typical
human capacities of perspective taking, mental flexibility and self-
regulation. This is a very important contribution. However, there re-
mains an explanatory gap between – in short – the functioning and col-
laboration between these brain circuits on the onehand and empathy as
a primarily dyadic, interactional and dynamic process of attunement on
the other hand. Interaction is both reaction and action, as Decety and
Jackson acknowledge. However, the phenomenology of empathy in-
volvesmore than a cycle of action and reaction at the level ofmotor rep-
ertoire, physiological responses, the presumed intentions and feelings
behind (or ‘within’) them and the neural correlates of these behavioural
andmental states. It presupposes a notion of ‘world’, a sharedworld, the
world of the personwithwhom one is empathizing aswell as theworld
of the subject who tries to empathize. Sharing this world implies a 3-D
kind of understanding of the needs and concerns of the other, paying at-
tention to his or her ‘landscape of saliences’, being aware of the effects of
the interaction itself on the behaviour, intentions, and emotions of the
other, and, of course, oneself.
We cannot require neuroscientists to do justice to all these different
aspects. What one could require however, is that their findings, includ-
ing the ways these findings are presented, remain consistent with the
general framework, which is interactional and dynamic. I have worries
in this respect. Decety and Jackson suggest about the future of social
neuroscience that “more discrete subdivision of the prefrontal cortex
is necessary because each subregion is likely to play a specific role in
empathy behavior”. Along this path of progressive decompositionthere awaits “ an important task to explore the respective computa-
tional role of every key region of the prefrontal cortex … in mental, af-
fective state attribution, as well as in executive functions, in relation to
how humans navigate the social world”. My worry is that this road of
further decomposing empathy will no longer remain in touch and be
consistent with a general framework that puts emphasis on interaction
and dynamic, in spite of Decety and Jackson's intentions.
The otherworry is that the shift from the interactional perspective to
what is going on inside the brain will lead to reintroduction of elements
of the traditional Humean framework. We saw that use of ‘old’ termi-
nology is quite common in the rapidly evolving field of social neurosci-
ence; think of the terms mind-reading, similarity (‘resemblance’) and
representation, with their mentalistic connotations. Decety and Jackson
are not entirely consistent in this respect, by on the onehand arguing for
a dynamical system view on empathy and on the other hand freely
speculate whether certain research findings can be seen evidence for
the brain as an internally simulating system.
It is again difficult to see how this can be avoided if interaction and
attunement are reconceptualised as processes that are going on in the
brain of the empathizing subject. Without a conception of the brain
that views the brain as fundamentally embedded in the body and in in-
teractionswith the context, the temptation to view empathy as a reflec-
tion or internal simulation within the brain of an interaction between
the person having the brain and someone else cannot be resisted. The
consequence is a (partial) return to old mentalistic ideas about
empathy.
I don't think there will be an easy solution for this problem in the
near foreseeable future. I agree with Kendler (2005) that psychiatry
must move beyond a prescientific “battle of paradigms”, should em-
brace complexity and support empirically rigorous and pluralistic ex-
planatory models. This would imply a strive for, what Kendler calls, a
‘patchy reductionism’, with the goal of ‘piecemeal integration’. In the
meantime, we should also strive for richer conceptual frameworks.
Much can be learned in this context from the so-called enactive ap-
proach. This novel approach to mental phenomena and mental disor-
ders sees them as the endpoint of a dynamical process; a process
which presumes interaction, development, and emergence. Traditional
approaches take their starting point in a behavioural phenotype and
view the underlying (dys)function or mechanism as a more or less
‘static’ condition within the individual. Adherents of the enactivist ap-
proach suggest that psycho(patho)logical phenomena should always
be conceived as (emergent) results of (patterns of) dynamic interac-
tions. There is no place here to give a more detailed account of this ap-
proach (see Thompson, 2007). Enactivism is still very much a
philosophical project, it has proven to be notoriously difficult to
operationalize enactivist views (see however Klin, Jones, Schultz, &
Volkmar, 2003, Lewis, 2005; de Jaegher, 2013; Glas, in press). Maybe
we should be content with the suggestions of Kendler (2005), on the
condition that researchers keep their conceptual frameworks open for
the required interactional and dynamic approaches that enactivism en-
visions. These insights and intuitionswill then serve than as reminder of
the richness and complexity of empathy as human capacity.
This openness requires tolerance of the inherent vagueness of
boundary questions. This vagueness might disappear someday, when
a clever researcher invents an operationalisation of a question that
until then was thought to be just philosophical; or when an equally
clever philosopher detects a way of putting the problem at hand in a
new, transforming light. We saw that these boundary questions typi-
cally occur in the transition zones between science, clinical practice,
and everyday folk psychological understanding. The interactional and
dynamic nature of the folk psychological concept of empathy could
only partially be justice be done to in a neuroscientific context. This apo-
ria in turnwas as an invitation to thinkdifferently about the brain, not as
an organ that ‘produces’ a set of activities that – as neural processes – re-
main confined within the skull, but as an ensemble of dynamically
interacting networkswhich themselves can only defined in conjunction
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ing world. But, as a skeptic voice might ask, are we, then, still talking
about the brain? Or, are we dealing with something bigger than the
brain, a variant of Andy Clark's ‘extended brain’ (Clark, 2011)? Does
the notion of neural functioning as something physical not evaporate
in such broader conceptualizations? But, the reverse seems to hold
too: did neural functioning as a physical process not already evaporate
in some of today's branches of neuroscience, in variants of what has be-
come known as connectomics, with its manymeanings of the term net-
work and its different definitions of connectivity (Seung, 2013; Sporns,
2012)? Current neuroscience is full of philosophical questions. Neuro-
scientist may deny this, but it seems wiser to choose the other bet and
uphold the view that neuroscience can only be better off by opening-
up for the philosophical dimension of its empirical challenges.
To conclude,we havemainly followed the line fromoutside to inside
neuroscience, by focusing on the question what neuroscience can make
of an interactional concept like empathy. But we might also take the
other direction, from inside out, and askwhether itwouldmake a differ-
ence to the attitudes and decisions of clinicians and lay people, if they
would have in-depth knowledge about the neuroscientific underpin-
nings of empathy (see Lebowitz & Ahn, 2014 for an empirical approach
to this question). After the discussion in this paper, I would like to sug-
gest, that it would make a difference. There is, for instance, sound em-
pirical evidence that empathy is more than just resonance of what is
going on in the other and that it involves other capacities like flexibly
adopting the stance of the other, while maintaining one's own point of
view. This is important to notice. One other thing is the finding of the
functional overlap between perception and action and the concomitant
notion of perception – action coupling. This idea has given a strong im-
petus to the view that the brain should be seen as a self-organizing link
in a cycle of interactions between subject and environment. This impe-
tus toward a more dynamic and interactional model of brain function-
ing replaces the old ‘sandwich’ model of brain functioning in which
the brain is basically thought as the organ that is squeezed between
(sensory, environmental) input and (motor and mental) output. It is
in other words because of these newer findings that we have begun to
think differently about brain-mediated processes. They are no longer
seen as just the output of an ‘organ’, but as the result of dynamic, multi-
level interactions between the subject and his/her context. This is why
the work of Decety and Jackson is so interesting: their minds are open
for other, richer conceptualizations. The criticism in this paper should
be seen as an exhortation to continue with following this path.References
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